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AVIATION LAW-TORT LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE TO PERSONS OR PROPERTY 
ON THE GROUND-RES IPSA LoQUITUR-Plaintiff's fishing vessel was struck 
and sunk by a practice bomb released from a Marine Corps aircraft. An 
action was brought against the government under the Federal Tort Claims 
Act.1 Plaintiff could produce no proof of negligence on th~ part of the 
government. Held, recovery allowed. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is 
applicable. Goodwin v. United States, (E.D. N.C. 1956) 141 F. Supp. 445. 
Aviation accidents may be broadly classified into two groups: those in-
volving injury to passengers, and those involving injury or damages to 
persons 9r property qn the ground. Different theories of liability have been 
applied to each of these situations. In passenger cases the courts have gen-
erally required proof of negligence on the part -of the owner or _operator of 
the aircraft.2 The more recent of these cases have permitted the plaintiff to 
128 u.s.c. (1952) §1346(b). 
2 Seaman v. Curtis.5 Flying Service, 231 App. Div. 867, 247 N.Y.S. 251 (1930); Johnson 
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employ the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.3 In the relatively few common law 
decisions involving injury to persons or property on the ground, the theory 
of liability has not been completely clear. In most ground damage cases 
the courts have allowed the plaintiff to recover without introducing factual 
evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant. Some ground damage 
cases completely avoid the negligence issue and impose liability without 
any plea as to the fault of the defendant. Liability in these cases seems to 
rest on traditional trespass to land doctrines.4 Under the trespass theory, 
any unprivileged entry onto land gives rise to liability.5 In a few ground 
damage cases, there is an indication that the court actually has imposed strict 
liability for the reason that aircraft are extrahazardous instrumentalities.6 
Eminent authorities interpret these cases as resting on extrahazardous in-
strumentality principles and, in most instances, the writers support the 
theory as applied to aviation.7 Some authorities would impose strict liabil-
ity for policy reasons even if aviation were held to be reasonably safe.8 
Some courts, as in the principal case, have applied the rules of ordinary 
negligence actions, including the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.9 While in 
result consistent with the absolute liability cases, the res ipsa loquitur 
decisions are clearly in conflict with at least one of the bases for the im-
v. Eastern Airlines, (2d Cir. 1949) 177 F. (2d) 713. See generally 6 A.L.R. (2d) 528, n. 5 
(1949). 
8 Lobel v. American Airlines, (2d Cir. 1951) 192 F. (2d) 217; Hassman v. Pacific 
Alaska Air Express, (D.C. Alaska 1951) 100 F. Supp. I. Contra, Morrison v. Le Toumeau 
Co. of Georgia, (5th Cir. 1943) 138 F. (2d) 339. 
4 Guille v. Swan, 19 Johns. (N.Y.) 381 (1822): Rochester Gas & Electric Corp. v. 
Dunlop, 148 Misc. 849, 266 N.Y.S. 469 (1933). 
5 PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 55 (1955). 
6 In Rochester Gas & Electric Co. v. Dunlop,, note 4 supra, at 851-852, the court said 
that the defendant had committed an "inexcusable trespass" because "common experience 
requires the ••• conclusion .•• that no matter how perfectly constructed or how carefully 
managed an aeroplane may be, it may still fall •..• " See also D'Anna v. United States, 
(4th Cir. 1950) 181 F. (2d) 335; Parcell v. United States, (S.D. W.Va. 1951) 104 F. Supp. 110. 
7 Professor Bohlen interprets Rochester Gas & Electric Co. v. Dunlop, note 5 supra, as 
an application of the strict liability rule derived from Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 H.L. 330 
(1868). He says: "If .•• aviators are to be required to answer for harm done to ground-
owners despite the exercise of all conceivable precaution, skill, and care to prevent it, the 
liability is imposed because of the peculiar hazards of aviation." Bohlen, "Aviation Under 
the Common Law," 48 HARV. L. REv. 216 at 219 (1934). In 3 TORTS RE.5TATEMENT §520, 
comment b (1938), aviation is classified as ultrahazardous. (Professor Bohlen was the chief 
draftsman of the Restatement.) PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 56 (1955), interprets the Rochester 
Gas & Electric case as "strict liability on the basis of trespass" but goes on to say "most of 
the other decisions have turned upon the dispute as to whether aviation is to be treated 
as an abnormal and excessively hazardous activity ...• " Parcell v. United States, note 6 
supra, is the only case cited by Prosser which directly involved the issue of whether avia-
tion is extrahazardous. See also Vold, "Strict Liability for Aircraft Crashes and Forced 
Landings on Ground Victims Outside of Established Landing Areas," 5 HAsrmcs L.J. I 
(1953). 
8 See Vold, "Strict Liability for Aircraft Crashes and Forced Landings on Ground 
Victims Outside of Established Landing Areas," 5 HAsTINcs L.J. I (1953). 
9 In addition to the principal case, see United States v. Kesinger, (10th Cir. 1951) 190 
F. (2d) 529. The court refused to apply res ipsa Ioquitur in Williams v. United States, 
(5th Cir. 1955) 218 F. (2d) 473. 
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position of liability without fault. The use of res ipsa loquitur amounts 
to an assertion that aviation is so safe that an unexplained accident can 
best be attributed to negligent conduct.1° Clearly, this principle cannot 
be reconciled with the proposition that public policy deems aviation so 
dangerous that strict liability should be imposed.11 This apparent con-
flict may, of course, be explained by attributing to the courts an unaware-
ness of the fact that the doctrines of res ipsa loquitur and extrahazardous 
instrumentality are fundamentally inconsistent.12 A more likely explana-
tion is that the courts have never considered aviation to be extrahazard-
ous.13 The imposition of liability without fault in ground damage cases 
may be explained simply as the result of classic trespass doctrines or basic 
policy considerations.14 The authorities supporting the strict liability 
view may well have read more into these decisions than the courts intended 
and in so doing have created, on the surface at least, a basic conflict in the 
case law. This is not to say that it is erroneous or futile to advocate the 
imposition of strict liability in ground damage cases. It has been strongly 
urged that absolute liability should be applied in such cases as a result of 
pure policy considerations.15 A basis for strict liability might also be found 
in the trespass to land that is usually present; yet the law of trespass is 
changing and the modern view is that no liability is imposed for non-
negligent, unintentional trespass.16 In any case, if absolute liability-the 
most desirable theory from plaintiff's standpoint-cannot be justified on 
either policy or trespass principles, the plaintiff may plead a negligence 
10 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2509 (1940). 
11 On the other hand, the passenger cases which apply negligence principles but refuse 
to use res ipsa loquitur are not necessarily inconsistent with the extrahazardous theory. It 
is possible to theorize that a passenger assumes the risk of the extra hazard and may 
recover only upon showing that negligence has increased the risk. Bohlen, "Aviation 
Under the Common Law," 48 HARv. L. REv. 216 (1943). In many recent passenger cases, 
however, courts have permitted the plaintiff to plead res ipsa loquitur. Lobel v. American 
Airlines, note 3 supra; Rassman v. Pacific Alaska Air Express, note 3 supra. As in the 
ground damage cases, this would appear to refute the proposition that aviation is extra-
hazardous. 
12 At least one court seems to be unaware of the inconsistency. See Parcell v. United 
States, note 6 supra. 
13 One case expressly states that aviation is not extrahazardous. Boyd v. White, 128 
Cal. App. (2d) 641, 276 P. (2d) 92 (1954). The language in Rochester Gas &: Electric Co. 
v. Dunlop, note 4 supra, may be interpreted as going to the question of whether the tres-
pass of an aircraft in distress is privileged. D'Anna v. United States, note 6 supra, was 
decided under a Maryland statute. The language of the court in regard to common law 
liability is dictum. In Parcell v. United States, note 6 supra, the court bases liability on 
res ipsa loquitur as well as absolute liability principles. This greatly weakens the case as 
authority. 
14 Parcell v. United States, note 6 supra, will not fit either of these theories, however. 
15 Persons on the ground have no direct interest in aviation. Unlike passengers, they 
are passive bystanders subjected to the risks of passing aircraft without sharing in the direct 
benefits of the activity. See Vold, "Strict Liability for Aircraft Crashes and Forced Landings 
on Ground Victims Outside of Established Landing Areas," 5 HAsnNGs L.J. 1 (1953). 
16 PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 55 (1955). 
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action. Courts are often willing to allow the use of res ipsa loquitur,11 and 
the principal case evidences the fact that recovery is reasonably certain 
under negligence theories aided by the res ipsa doctrine.is 
Allan L. Bioff 
17 United States v. Kesinger, note 9 supra; Parcell v. United States, note 6 supra. 
18 See 37 CoRN. L.Q. 543 (1952) indicating that res ipsa loquitur as applied in aviation 
accident cases is often tantamount to absolute liability. 
